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International Unions
By ALBERTO ALESINA, IGNAZIO ANGELONI, AND FEDERICO ETRO*
We model an international union as a group of countries deciding to centralize the
provision of public goods, or policies, that generate externalities across union
members. The trade-off between the benefits of coordination and the loss of
independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition, and scope of
the union. Policy uniformity reduces the size of the union, may block the entry of
new members, and induces excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with
nonuniform policies that reduce these inefficiencies, focusing particularly on ar-
rangements that are relevant to the ongoing debate on the institutional structure of
the European Union. (JEL D71, H11, H41)
Historically, the nation-state has monopo-
lized authority in most policy domains. Re-
cently, a more complex institutional picture has
emerged, characterized by more autonomy for
subnational levels of government and, at the
same time, the strengthening of supranational
jurisdictions that exercise certain policy prerog-
atives on behalf of all members; we refer to
these as “international unions.” World eco-
nomic integration is responsible for both devel-
opments. On the one hand, in an integrated
world subnational jurisdictions can prosper in-
dependently because their market is the world.1
On the other hand, increasing integration leads
to more externalities, the need for coordination,
and the creation of supranational jurisdiction.2
Examples are the United Nations, regional trade
agreements, currency unions, and military
alliances.
The most prominent example is the European
Union (EU), whose goal has been the provision of
public goods and common policies for the mem-
ber states. Since the 1990s, the EU has substan-
tially broadened its scope of action to include—in
addition to a common trade policy and a single
internal market—a monetary union, coordinated
fiscal policies, and various aspects of domestic
policies.3 A free trade area improves international
specialization and can provide its participants with
a hedge against asymmetric economic shocks. A
single currency increases price transparency
across borders and may foster aggregate price
stability in the currency area, to the benefit of all
participants. Merging and coordinating certain ex-
pensive space communication technologies gener-
ates economies of scale.
However, the harmonization of policies
across the union (a typical way in which the EU
implements policies) may conflict with diverse
national preferences. In fact, the trade-off be-
tween the benefits of centralized coordination
and the costs of homogeneity is precisely the
essence of much of the current discussion in the
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1 See Alesina and Enrico Spolaore (2003) for a discus-
sion of the size of political jurisdiction in general and with
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EU. This debate is also spurred by the prepara-
tion of a European Constitution and by the entry
in the EU of many new members, mostly from
Central and Eastern Europe, with diverse econ-
omies. There may be inconsistencies between
the deepening of the scope of the EU and its
enlargement.4 In fact, the ongoing constitutional
debate in the EU is struggling with finding the
correct balance between coordination and cen-
tralization of policies at the EU level and au-
tonomy of member countries. This debate has
not reached a consensus by any means.
In order to shed light on these questions, we
model an international union as a group of
countries heterogeneous in preferences that de-
cide to coordinate the provision of certain pub-
lic goods generating international spillovers
across union members. We examine, in partic-
ular, the forces that determine the equilibrium
size and composition of unions, and discuss
normative and positive aspects concerning the
attribution of policy prerogatives between the
union and the member states; in particular, we
explore a variety of possible cases of joint re-
sponsibility between the union and member
countries in the choice of policy.
Our paper is related to two different strands
of literature. First, the literature on fiscal feder-
alism (spurred by Wallace Oates, 1972), takes
the size of a union as given and assumes a
uniform policy across countries—a feature that
characterizes what we call a “rigid union.” Re-
cent contributions by Timothy Besley and Ste-
phen Coate (2003) and Ben Lockwood (2002)
have explored alternative arrangements that do
not impose policy uniformity, taking the size of
the union as given. A second strand of the
literature discusses the endogenous determina-
tion of the size of the union, assuming policy
uniformity. Work along this line includes
Alesina and Vittorio Grilli (1993) and Alesina
and Robert Barro (2002) on monetary unions
and Sang-Seung Yi (1996) on custom unions.
We proceed in two steps. First, we consider a
rigid union and show that it generates other
inefficiencies beyond the lack of adaptability to
local preferences pointed out by Oates (1972).
There is first a tendency toward a reduction in
the equilibrium size of the union and hence of
the externalities associated with it (“small size
bias”).5 Moreover, the political structure can
prevent potentially efficient enlargements be-
cause of a form of “status quo bias.” Without a
constitutional commitment to centralize only
certain policies, a bias toward excessive central-
ization emerges, leading to an inefficient size of
the union.
Our second step is to remove the assumption
of policy uniformity and study simple rules that
add flexibility and improve the allocation of
resources. We focus on arrangements that are
relevant to the debate on the institutional design
of the EU or, more generally, in the context of
other existing federal structures, in which the
final policy outcome is the result of an interac-
tion between the union and member countries,
like subsidiarity, federal mandates, systems of
subsidies and transfers between the union and
its members, and enhanced cooperation among
a subset of members of the union. We show
under which conditions these institutional ar-
rangements help limit the inefficiencies of a
rigid union and when they are politically sup-
ported. We highlight the role of the constitu-
tional design of the union (in particular the
hierarchy between governments at the country
level and at the union level) in generating
Pareto-efficient reforms. For instance, a surpris-
ing result emerges if, in a rigid union with a
uniform provision of public goods, countries are
allowed individually to add extra expenditure.
One may think that countries with strong pref-
erences for public spending would support such
a reform: in reality, these are the only countries
that may oppose the reform and prefer the rigid
union. The reason is that this reform would
reduce the uniform provision chosen in political
equilibrium at the union level so as to rely on
the extra-provision of individual countries. The
extent of such “free riding by voting” changes
according to the hierarchy between the union
4 See Alesina and Romain Wacziarg (1999), Alesina et
al. (2001a, b), Guido Tabellini (2003), and Marco Buti et al.
(2003).
5 Alesina and Spolaore (2003) have emphasized a re-
lated tendency toward suboptimal size of countries. The
two results have, however, different motivations. The
size of countries in that model depends on a trade-off
between scale economies and cost of citizens’ distance
from an exogenous public good, while here the size of
unions depends on a trade-off between the benefits of
policy coordination and the cost of endogenous policy-
making at the union level.
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and its members, and it is lower when countries
have priority over the union.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I
describes the basic model, characterizes the
equilibrium size of rigid unions, and discusses
issues of enlargement and trade-off between
centralization and the size of the union. Section
II discusses flexible unions, introducing differ-
ent systems where policies differ across coun-
tries because competencies are shared between
the union and its members. Section III con-
cludes. All proofs of the propositions are in the
Appendix.
I. The Basic Model
Consider a group of equally sized countries
that differ only in their preferences for public
goods. Assuming exogenous income y and lump
sum taxes used to finance (with a balanced
budget) national public spending gi  0, the
utility function for the representative individual
of an independent country i is:
(1) Ui  y  gi  i Hgi 
which is linear in private consumption (y  gi)
and where Hg  0 and Hgg  0. The
parameters i  0 capture how much the rep-
resentative individual of country i values public
consumption relative to private consumption:
countries are ordered such that 1  2  ... .
Countries can join in a union where public
spending creates cross-country spillovers cap-
tured by the parameter   (0, 1). Hence, the
representative individual in country i in a union
with N members has utility
(2) Ui  y  gi  i Hgi   
j 1,ji
N
gj .
Membership in the union is a necessary condi-
tion for receiving the externalities.6 Decentral-
ized choices imply underprovision of public
goods, as is well known. The first best union
would include all countries and satisfy the sys-
tem of Samuelson optimality conditions:
(3) i Hggi   
ji
gj
 1   
ji
j Hggj   
kj
gk  i
which shows that the marginal social cost of
public goods is smaller than the unitary mar-
ginal private cost. Implementation of the first
best requires that the union dictates a different
policy for each country, depending on prefer-
ences. This seems unrealistic since information
about countries’ preferences is not publicly
available, or at least not verifiable. Even if an
independent authority could implement differ-
entiated policies, Besley and Coate (2003) show
that a tendency toward strategic delegation
of its representatives would create further
inefficiencies.7
A. Rigid Unions
The simplest alternative, following the stan-
dard theory of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972), is
that every member adopt the same policy (“rigid
union”). To determine such a policy, we assume
a one-country-one-vote rule and majority voting
in the union. The one-country-one-vote rule is
reasonable in our model since all countries have
equal size. In most real world unions, voting
rights are distributed as a function of size, but
more equally than would be implied by the
relative size of members states, i.e., smaller
countries weight more than their size. The EU is
no exception (nor is the United States). As for
majority voting, in the EU many decisions re-
quire supermajorities or unanimity, an issue to
which we briefly return below.
Given the structure of preferences, the me-
dian voter theorem applies and the level of
spending chosen by a N-sized union solves the
following first-order condition:
6 This is a simplifying assumption that could be relaxed
without essential changes in the results (see Etro, 2002).
Notice that models where public spending is a public input
in the production function (as in Alesina and Wacziarg,
1999) are also nested in our general specification: in that
case, preference heterogeneity is endogenized in terms of
income heterogeneity between countries, and all our results
go through. 7 See also Etro (2004).
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(4) mHggm	1N 1

1
1N 1
which defines a function gm  g(m, N, )
increasing in m, the preference parameter of
the median country in the union. Let us define
	 (x)  Hxx(x)x/Hx(x) as the elasticity of the
marginal utility of public goods (the lower this
is, the more highly substitutable private and
public spending are). Then, gm decreases (in-
creases) with the size of the union and of the
spillovers if the elasticity of the marginal utility
of public goods is higher (lower) than unity.
These ambiguous results are due to the usual
substitution and income effects. Entry of a new
member with a preference for the public goods
lower than the median may determine greater
spending, if the concavity of the utility function
is not too strong: the intuition is that in this case
the substitution effect (more public goods be-
cause there are new spillovers to exploit) more
than compensates the income effect (more pri-
vate consumption because spillovers on public
goods already increase with the entry of the
additional member) and the change of the me-
dian toward the preference of the entrant.
B. The Equilibrium Size of the Union
We now analyze an “initial stage” of union
formation in which any country can unilaterally
join a single union.8 The utility of country i in a
union of N countries with median m and spill-
overs  is:
(5) V iinm , N y gm , N, 
 iHgm , N, 	1 N 1
.
Clearly, the utility of a country outside the
union is Viout  Viin(i, 1). The net utility ofjoining the union is the function (i, , N) 
Viin(m, N)  Viout. We define an equilibrium
union as one in which all (subsets of) members
prefer to be members of the union and vice
versa for the outsiders. Intuitively, the members
of the union will be those countries with pref-
erences not too different from the median. This
result can be easily established under one suf-
ficient (but not necessary) condition that there is
a limit on the heterogeneity of preferences and
on the concavity of the utility function, i/m 
1  	 (g) @i.
An example makes the role of the assumption
clear. If the function H(x) is isoelastic, H(x) 
x1	/(1  	 ), the net utility of joining a union
is:
i , , N   11  	

  	1  N  1
1 	/	m1/	

  im  1  	  	i1/	
which is an inverted U curve in i with (0, ,
N)  0, (m, , N)  0 and (i, , N) 
0. Note that under our assumption, (i, , N)
is always increasing in N. This implies that for
a given median, the equilibrium union is the
largest group of NE countries such that (i, ,
NE)  0 only for i  NE: this equilibrium will
be unique.
PROPOSITION 1: An equilibrium union is
composed of countries with contiguous prefer-
ences, and its size is weakly increasing in the
size of the spillovers.
Intuitively, members of the unions are coun-
tries close to each other in preferences who gain
in the trade-off between the benefits from co-
operation and the costs from the loss of inde-
pendent policymaking; the cost is relatively
small precisely because the countries are close
in preferences. As in Oates (1972), centraliza-
tion in a rigid union has the benefit of internal-
izing spillovers in policymaking and the cost of
giving up to adaptability to local preferences.
Under uniform provision of public goods, how-
ever, the rigidity of central policymaking limits
the size of the union and hence it reduces total
spillovers.
C. Enlargement
Under which conditions will the members of
an existing equilibrium union decide to accept a
8 There is a similarity between this model and the theory
of club goods. However, in the latter, congestion costs
usually limit the size of a club of identical members.
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new candidate country? This is an important
question for the EU today. After its initial for-
mation, many new countries have joined, most
recently formerly communist nations from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe.
Notice that if two new candidate countries (or
equally sized groups of countries) on opposite
sides of the median apply, under our assump-
tions they will unambiguously raise the utility
of all the incumbents and therefore will be ad-
mitted. This implies that the interesting problem
is the admission of a single country.9 We as-
sume for now that a simple majority of mem-
bers is sufficient to admit a new entrant. The
entry of a new member has two effects: the first
is to increase utility by virtue of the internalized
externality; the second is to change the median
voter in the union. A majority of the members
must enjoy a positive net gain from these ef-
fects. It is immediate to prove:
PROPOSITION 2: An equilibrium union will
accept by majority voting a single new member
if and only if the change in the median after
entry is small enough.
Only countries close enough to the median of
the existing union are accepted; hence our model
rationalizes a form of status quo bias in union
reforms. If the approval of a new entrant requires
a qualified majority rule, it is easy to see that the
status quo bias is only reinforced. The limiting
case is the one in which approval of a new entrant
requires unanimity, like in the EU. The pivotal
country is the one with the preferences farthest on
the opposite side of the median with respect to the
candidate country. A solution to reduce the status
quo bias could be to admit members without vot-
ing power, which would allow any country to be
admitted; this is what recently happened when
Russia joined NATO. No such solution is cur-
rently envisaged in the EU.
D. Size and Scope of the Union
We now extend the model to consider the
case of multiple policies. Imagine F different
policies providing different public goods, or-
dered by the intensity of spillovers, 1  2
 ...  F. Assuming separability between
subutilities, the utility function is now:
(6) Ui y 
k1
F
gik i 
k1
F
Hgik 
ji
kgjk.
According to the voting procedure in the union,
different results may arise. We consider two
rules that are of particular interest from the
viewpoint of the EU constitutional debate. In
the first (Rule A), the union does not reach any
prior agreement on which policies are to be
centralized and which should be left to the
member states. The provision of each public
good by the union is voted with majority rule. In
the second (Rule B), the union can commit to
centralize just a subset of policies, giving up the
potential spillovers from the coordination of the
other policies. In this case, the union votes first
on the number of policies to centralize, and
then, having committed to centralize only those
policies, a second vote takes place on how much
of each should be provided.
This setting illustrates an important issue in
the recent EU constitutional debate, namely,
whether the areas of competence of the EU
should be explicitly listed in the Constitution
and the others explicitly excluded, or if, instead,
as the EU treaties do, the range of areas per-
taining to the union are left open or only
vaguely defined. In the latter case, the agenda of
the union is left open ex ante and is determined
case by case ex post through secondary legisla-
tion. We show here that there is a fundamental
difference between the two settings: the size and
scope of the resulting union are different in the
two cases. In sum, we consider the following
alternative voting rules:
RULE A. The provisions of each public good
are chosen by majority voting.
RULE B. The policies to centralize are chosen
by majority voting and, subsequently, for each
centralized policy, the provisions of each public
good are chosen by majority voting.
If G is the set of centralized policies, we
define ViG(m, N) as the indirect utility of coun-
try i. Clearly, the net gain from union member-
9 We examine one and only one instance of entry. Kevin
Roberts (1999) studies a model of dynamic enlargement of
clubs where the entry of a new member changes the median
and subsequent decisions about policy, and further enlarge-
ment will be taken by a different set of countries.
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ship for country i is (i, G)  ¥kG (i, k,
N). Consider the following definition:
A X-equilibrium union (m, N, G)E is a group
of N countries with a median voter character-
ized by m, providing a set of public goods G,
such that:
(a) Rule X  (A, B) applies;
(b) For each country i within the union, (i,
G)  0;
(c) In the set of the countries outside the union
there is not a subset of S countries (S) such
that:
VkG	S, m , N, N  S

 ViGi , 1  k  S
where  is the new median after the entry of
the subset of countries.
We can prove:
PROPOSITION 3: An equilibrium union with
multiple policies has a (weakly) larger size and
a (weakly) smaller set of centralized policies
under Rule B than under Rule A. Moreover, the
equilibrium union under Rule B is preferred to
the one under Rule A by at least a majority of its
members.
Intuitively, if Rule A is adopted, all policies
are centralized according to the median country
preferences, and the characterization of the
equilibrium union is a straight extension of the
single-policy case. The size of this union is
relatively small: some outsiders would have
preferred to centralize a lower number of poli-
cies and would have joined the union if this were
the case. In the process leading to the formation
of the union, a sort of time-inconsistency prob-
lem arises: once the union is formed, the median
extends excessively its powers, and the expec-
tation of this induces potential members to step
back from the beginning.
Under Rule B,10 member countries rationally
foresee the provision of public goods chosen by
the median for each centralized policy. Each
country has a preference on the policies it would
like to centralize. The median country would
still like to centralize all policies, while the
farther away from the median preferences a
country is, on both sides, the fewer policies this
country would want to centralize. In equilib-
rium the number of centralized policies is typ-
ically lower than F, and membership must be at
least as great as under Rule A. Hence, Rule A
generates a further form of small size bias,
whose source is the excessive centralization of
policies. Though general welfare comparisons
are complex, it is easy to build examples in
which Rule B Pareto dominates Rule A, while
the opposite can never happen.
The insight here is that an ex ante commit-
ment to centralize only a limited set of poli-
cies—those with the strongest spillovers—leads
to the creation of a larger union, preferred by a
majority of members. In the EU context, this
suggests that a clear constitutional commitment
to restrict the functions that the union can per-
form leads to more countries agreeing to partic-
ipate. Has this “small size bias” already become
relevant in the EU? The wave of membership
applications in recent years would seem to deny
that. However, the increasing reluctance of sev-
eral countries to endorse parts of the EU
agenda, the decreasing popularity of the EU in
public opinion, and even the problems to reach
an agreement on the new European Constitution
are clear symptoms of the difficulty of pursuing
simultaneously the goal of enlargement and that
of building an “ever closer union.”11
II. Flexible Unions
Three potential factors influence the size and
scope of a rigid union: policy uniformity re-
duces memberships and the associated spill-
overs; a status quo bias limits enlargement when
candidate countries differ from the incumbents;
and in the absence of a commitment to limit
delegation of powers to the union, there is ex-
cessive centralization leading to further reduc-
tion in the size of the union. In this section we
look at four forms of “flexible unions,” i.e.,
10 In the first stage the policy space is multidimensional
but, given the structure of the model, it can be reduced to a
unidimensional space (the number of policies with the high-
est spillovers to centralize) and single-peakedness holds. In
the second stage the policy space is multidimensional, but
preferences belong to the intermediate class and hence the
median voter theorem applies as well.
11 For a recent discussion of these issues, see Alesina and
Roberto Perotti (2004).
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unions where policy provision differs among
members. We know that optimality requires dif-
ferent policies for different members. However,
the organizational costs of discriminating policy
across the membership with different and not
verifiable preferences could be very large. It is
therefore useful to examine simple arrange-
ments—easily implementable rules applying
equally to all countries and approved by a ma-
jority of them—that can improve upon the rigid
union without relying on knowledge or verifi-
cation of the individual country’s preferences.12
A. Shared Responsibility
In many policy areas the final policy outcome
is the result of joint efforts of the EU and of
member countries. In fact, the prosed draft of
the EU Constitution contains a very long list of
policy areas on which members agree.
Subsidiary.—The first case of shared respon-
sibility that we consider is one in which the
union members are given the opportunity to
choose their own public goods provision in a
decentralized way. Further, the union votes on a
common level of spending to be provided by all
members. Hence, the union cannot commit ex
ante to a centralized policy, but can only act ex
post to limit the inefficiency of decentralized
policies. For lack of a better term we label this
arrangement “subsidiarity.”13
We formalize this principle imagining a two-
stage process in which: (a) member countries
independently choose their policies gis  0; and
then (b) the union chooses a common expendi-
ture gU  0 by majority voting. Utility for
country i is now Ui  y  gis  gU  iH(Gis),
where Gis  gis   ¥ji gjs  gU[1  (N 
1)]. The subsidiary role of the union is going to
induce free-riding behavior of each country in
the provision of public goods, but it allows
differentiation of policies according to prefer-
ences, at least to a certain degree. Under some
regularity conditions, in subgame perfect polit-
ico-economic equilibrium the countries with
stronger preferences for public goods choose
individual expenditure according to the follow-
ing condition:
(7) i Hg Gis 
	1  N  2

1  	1  N  1

while the common expenditure chosen by ma-
jority voting satisfies:
(8) m Hg Gms  
1
	1  N  1
 .
Notice that the union expenditure is chosen as in
the rigid union (the marginal social cost is un-
changed compared to [4]), while the free riding
of the single countries is biased: the marginal
private cost of public goods provision is always
greater than one and increasing in the number of
countries and in the spillovers. Remembering
that the desired level of public spending is in-
creasing in i, we can prove that:
PROPOSITION 4: In politico-economic equi-
librium: (a) the expenditure of the union with
subsidiarity is lower than in a rigid union; and
(b) the median country and all countries with
weaker preference for public goods do not
adopt individual expenditure, while only coun-
tries with strongest preference do.
The outcome is a compromise between a
decentralized solution and the rigid union.
Would a majority of countries prefer it to a rigid
union? The answer is yes. All countries not
providing additional individual expenditures
will spend less than in a rigid union, while
benefiting from the additional expenditure of
other countries, which makes them better off.
The median country has to be better off because
it could choose (for the union) the same amount
of expenditure of a rigid union and it would
benefit from the externality arising from the
additional public spending of those countries
which add above the level provided by the
union. Hence, a majority of countries is in favor
of the flexible system. Some of the other coun-
tries, i.e., those adding on the public spending
mandated by the union, may be worse off. In
fact, on the one hand the union is providing
fewer public goods, but on the other hand, coun-
12 For notational simplicity, in this section we assume
that N is an odd number.
13 The term “subsidiarity” in the context of the EU
captures the principle that country members have the re-
sponsibility on policy first, and then the EU may intervene.
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tries can to some extent individually compen-
sate for this. Interestingly, precisely those
countries that exploit the possibility of individ-
ual extra provision of public goods may end up
worse off, even if these are the countries that
benefit from public spending the most. An im-
portant implication is that the transition from a
rigid to a flexible union with subsidiarity tends
to be supported with simple majority rules, but
may be blocked with qualified majority rules.
Consider the special case with logarithmic
preferences and N  3. In case of interior equi-
librium, we have:14
g1s  g2s  0
g3s 
1  23
1   
1  22
1  
gmU 
2
1   
3
1  .
In this example, one can verify that this alloca-
tion delivers higher utility to each country than
under a rigid union; hence, subsidiarity will be
adopted by unanimity.
Federal Mandates.—We now turn to a situ-
ation where the union can commit ex ante to a
common policy and countries must take it as
given when they choose their extra provision in
a decentralized way. Such an institutional orga-
nization broadly represents a system of “federal
mandates,” an arrangement where each country
can choose and independently finance public
expenditures, but this must be at least equal to a
level decided by the union. This system is
widely used in environmental regulation but it
can be applied to many public goods or policies
with strong externalities. In game theoretic
terms, we can think of this situation as a two-
stage process where first (a) the union chooses
the federal mandate and then (b) each country
decides whether to provide further public goods.
Jacques Cre´mer and Thomas Palfrey (2000)
have studied this kind of arrangement; however
in their model, there are no externalities be-
tween countries. In our model, the federal man-
date accomplishes an important role: it limits
the free-riding of the decentralized equilibrium,
internalizing, to some extent, the externalities
produced in public goods provision.
Formally, utility for country i is Ui  y  gif
 fU  iH(Gif) where fU  0 is the federal
mandate, gif  0 the extra provisions of public
goods for country i and Gif  gif   ¥ji g jf fU[1  (N  1)]. Under regularity conditions,
in subgame perfect politico-economic equilib-
rium the federal mandate satisfies:
(9) m Hg Gmf  
	1  N˜  1

	1  N  1
1  
where N˜ is the (endogenous) number of coun-
tries with strongest preferences for public
spending, which provide extra public goods ac-
cording to:
(10) i Hg Gif  1.
The adoption of a federal standard induces free-
riding behavior of the union. For the union, the
marginal cost of public spending is greater than
one, which remains the marginal cost of each
country as in a decentralized setting, but it is
larger than the marginal cost of a rigid union,
1/[1  (N  1)]. Hence, even the equilibrium
federal mandate is lower than the common pro-
vision chosen by a rigid union. Moreover, we
can prove:
PROPOSITION 5: In politico-economic equi-
librium (a) the federal mandate is lower than
the expenditure of a rigid union; and (b) the
median country and all countries with weaker
preference for the public good do not add any
extra expenditure, while only countries with
stronger preference do.
The free riding by voting induced by a low
federal mandate increases the incentives of coun-
tries with higher preference for public goods in-
dividually to provide them and it consequently
makes the other countries better off. The median
country and all the countries with weaker prefer-
ence for public goods are in favor of the introduc-
tion of federal mandates in a rigid union.
14 This requires intermediate levels of heterogeneity. In
particular, (1  )/(1  )  3/2  (1  )/(1  ).
For low heterogeneity there is no extra expenditure by any
country (like in the rigid union) and for high heterogeneity
gmU  0 and g3s  3 (like in the decentralized outcome).
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However, their free riding may induce some coun-
tries with stronger preferences for the public good
than the median to prefer a rigid union.15
Consider the special case of logarithmic pref-
erences and three countries. In the relevant in-
terior equilibrium, which requires   1⁄2 , we
have:
g1f  g2f  0
g3f 
3
1    2 1  2
f mU  2 
3
1  1  2
which now can make country 3 worse off com-
pared to the rigid union: in that case, the adop-
tion of federal mandates would be supported by
just the two countries with weaker preferences
for public goods.16
The main message of comparative politics
that should be drawn from this discussion is that
a flexible organization which properly shares
competencies between countries and the union
can be desirable, but the way this organization
is built is fundamental to create gains for all
members. It is crucial to decide whether the
union should commit to a centralized policy
before its members choose their policies in a
decentralized way. A simple comparison of the
equilibrium conditions shows that common
spending is higher under subsidiarity than with
federal mandates (gmU  fmU), while individual
extra provision is higher under federal mandates
(gjf  gjs): free riding by voting is stronger when
the union can commit to its policy. The differ-
ence between indirect utility with federal man-
dates and subsidiarity makes the trade-off
explicit for each country i:
(11) i   i 	HGif  HGis

 gis gif gmU fmU.
Countries with weak enough preferences for
public goods always gain under federal man-
dates because of the greater private consump-
tion, even if utility from public goods is lower,
while countries with stronger preferences for
public spending gain under subsidiarity from a
smaller individual contribution to public goods
provision (but with a lower utility from public
goods).17
Finally, notice that the adoption of subsidiar-
ity and federal mandates can enlarge the equi-
librium size of the union since, under these
arrangements, all countries with strong enough
preferences for public spending will be willing
to join the union, and this would create new
spillovers (which in turn relaxes the conditions
for accepting the enlargement).
B. Matching Grants
We now study a simple system of taxes and
subsidies which is inspired by widespread
forms of intergovernmental transfers, usually
referred to as matching grants. There are exam-
ples of this in the way the EU provides incen-
tives for regional investment; for each euro
invested nationally, a supplementary fraction is
added by the union. We assume that a constant
subsidy s is granted for each unit of national
public goods expenditure and financed with
taxes Ti  sgi , where gi is the average of
expenditures of all the other countries. Hence
the tax paid by country i is independent of its
choice of spending, and the union budget con-
straint is always satisfied. Each country i has
utility
(12) Ui  y  gi  Ti
 i Hgi 1  s   
ji
gj 1  s .
15 A similar result is obtained by Catherine Hafer and
Dimitri Landa (2005) who rework our model in presence of
income heterogeneity.
16 The interior equilibrium requires   1⁄2 and interme-
diate levels of heterogeneity, that is, (1  2)(1  ) 
3/2  (1  2)(1  )/. For low heterogeneity there is
no extra expenditure by any country (like in the rigid union).
When   1⁄2 , as long as 3/2  1/, the median voter
theorem holds but the utility of the median country is not
differentiable at its pick. In this case:
g1f  g2f  0 g3f 
3  2
1   f m
U 
2  3
1  1  2 .
Finally, for high heterogeneity f mU  0 and g3f  3 (like
in the decentralized outcome). 17 In our example, (i)  0 for i  1, 2 and (3)  0.
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In this analysis we focus on the case where
the union commits ex ante to its policy, that is,
to a subsidy. Subsequently, the choice of each
country satisfies iHg(1  s)  1 and gener-
ates individual spending functions gi  gi(s),
which are increasing (constant) in the subsidy if
and only if 	  ()1. Hence, indirect utility for
country i is
Vi s  y  gi s  s
¥ji gj s
N  1
 i H 1  sgi s   
ji
gj s .
Maximizing this with respect to the subsidy
provides the optimal subsidy for country i. It
turns out that under weak conditions, we have
an interior equilibrium which is increasing in
i, hence the median voter theorem holds, and
the political equilibrium subsidy sm satisfies the
following condition:
(13)
 N  11  smgm sm gm  N  1  1  sm 
 	sm  N  1
¥jm gj sm gm 
where we made use of the optimality condition
for individual spending in the median country.
In this formula, the left-hand side represents the
direct effect of a change in the subsidy, and it is
evaluated according to the preferences of the
median country compared to the average one.
The right-hand side is the indirect effect due to
the impact on public spending in other coun-
tries: when the subsidy is low (which implies
underspending), the indirect marginal effect of
an increase in the subsidy is beneficial only if it
increases spending by the other countries (if
	  1). As one can easily verify, the subsidy
s*  (N  1) delivers the first best allocation
of public expenditure, equivalent to (3). The
intuition for this is quite simple. The additional
expenditure in the public good provided by the
union distorts the incentives to invest in the
public good. These incentives are the same for
every country, as in the first best if the marginal
cost of public expenditure equates its social
marginal cost. But this is the same for every
country and given by 1/[1  (N  1)]; hence
this equality is satisfied under the proposed sub-
sidy. In general, however, the equilibrium sub-
sidy may be above or below the optimal value.
For instance, in the simple case of isoelastic
preferences, the politico-economic equilibrium
subsidy can be implicitly expressed as
sm  s*  	gm sm   gmgm  .
More generally, we can conclude with:
PROPOSITION 6: The politico-economic equi-
librium subsidy to national public spending im-
plements the first best allocation of public
expenditure only if median public spending is
the same as the average. Under this condition,
there is always a system of transfers that give
rise to the first best union.
What this suggests is that efficient coordina-
tion is possible if median preferences in the
union are close enough to the average prefer-
ences. For instance, in the logarithmic utility
case we can explicitly derive the equilibrium
subsidy as:
sm 
1  N  1
1 
N
1  N  1   mm 
 1
which coincides with the optimal subsidy only
if the median preference m coincides with the
average preference   (1/N) ¥i1N i.18 Infor-
mally, as long as the median country is not
excessively biased toward low or high public
expenditure compared to the average country, a
union close to the first best can be created with
a system of taxes and transfers: in this case, the
small size bias would disappear. Unfortunately,
this does not need to be the case in general: the
political equilibrium subsidy might be too low
to be accepted by countries with high preference
for public spending or too high to be accepted
by countries with low preference for public
18 With general isoelastic utility, the first best allocation
requires m equal to the heterogeneity index [¥i1N i1/	/N]	,
which is higher (lower) than the average preference for 	 
() 1.
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spending, and may be hardly implementable in
practice. Nevertheless, our result shows that a
system of intergovernmental transfers could be
very useful to enlarge the benefits of policy
coordination, at least in a union with a balanced
distribution of preferences.
C. Enhanced Cooperation
Under this arrangement, subsets of union
members can centralize certain policies among
themselves, without the other members of the
union participating. This arrangement is explic-
itly allowed by the proposed new EU Constitu-
tion and is already used by the EU in certain
policy areas. For example, only some members
have adopted the single currency, or agreed to
common border controls. The Amsterdam
Treaty (1997) introduced a formal framework
for enhanced cooperation, whereby any group
of (at least eight) members can take action in
particular areas, while other members opt out.19
The analysis in this case is a direct extension
of that with multiple policies, and we omit it
here for brevity. The resulting union is (weakly)
larger than the one arising under Rule A (and
Rule B as well), and is preferred by countries
with extreme preferences, while it may hurt the
median country.20
III. Conclusions
We have modeled an international union as a
set of heterogeneous countries deciding to-
gether on the provision of certain public goods
(or policies) that generate externalities across
union members. Under uniform provision of the
public good (rigid union) several inefficiencies
arise, including a “small union bias,” a “status
quo bias” in accepting new members, and a
trade-off between the size and the scope of the
union. We have analyzed some simple forms of
“flexibility” among those that are either dis-
cussed, or could potentially be relevant, in the
context of the debate on EU constitutional form.
These flexible schemes can improve welfare
and even, under restrictive conditions, attain the
social optimum.
There is, however, an organizational trade-
off. Rigid unions are reasonably simple to im-
plement, although, as we discussed, they may
generate inefficiencies. More flexible unions
may require complex organizational arrange-
ments that could be complex and difficult to
implement. This trade-off is indeed at the fore-
front of the current constitutional debate in
Europe.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Under our assumption, we have:
N i , , N   i , , N  1
 i  mi 1  1	  0
for any i. Hence, if a country i with prefer-
ences such that (i , , N)  0 did not
belong to the union, it could join and hence
move its median toward i and increase the
number of members: both factors would in-
crease its net gain from membership. Then, in
equilibrium there is a compact set of prefer-
ences around the median satisfying (, ,
N)  0, such that all and only all countries
with preferences in this set belong to the
union.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Immediate under our assumption after impos-
ing Viin(, N  1)  Viin(m, N) for a majority
of members, and Viin(, N  1)  Viout for all
of them, where  is the new median after entry.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
First, notice that for all centralized policies
the median country chooses the common provi-
sion gmk  g(m, N, k), since preferences be-
long to the intermediate class defined by Jean-
Michel Grandmont (1978), and the median
voter theorem holds even with multiple policies.
Under our assumptions, (i, k, N)  0.
Hence, it must be that whenever a country
wants (not) to centralize policy z, the same
country wants (not) to centralize any policy k 
() z. This implies that we can identify the set
of centralized policies with the index number of
19 Massimo Bordignon and Sandro Brusco (2003) intro-
duce uncertainty on the benefit of coordination in a dynamic
model of union formation, and rationalize enhanced coop-
eration as an optimal step toward full coordination.
20 More details of the derivation are available from the
authors.
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the policy in the set that has the highest spill-
overs. Then, in a union (m, N, K), the net gain
from union membership can be written as:
i , K 
k1
K
i , k , N
 i , K  1  i , K , N.
By Proposition 1, we know that (i, k, N)  0
for any i Ak where Ak is a set such that AF
AF1  ...  A1. By the properties of a vertical
sum of functions, it follows that (i, G)  0
for any i  SG where SF  SF1  ...  S1,
and that for each i there is a favorite number of
centralized policies Ki with 1  K1  K2 ... 
Km  F. By construction it must be that (i,
K, N)  0 iff K  Ki. Using this and (14) it
follows that:
i , K  i , K  1 iff K Ki ,
which implies single-peakedness of (i, K) in
K for all i.
Under Rule A, G  F and the largest set of
countries for which (i , F)  0 joins the
union. Under Rule B, in the stage where coun-
tries vote on the set of centralized policies,
the median voter theorem holds, as we have
proved, and G  F. Existence and uniqueness
depend on coalition proofness. Imagine that
there are two equilibria: (m, N, K)E and (m,
N, K)E. Our discussion implies that if N 
N, then K  K and vice versa. Then, the
countries excluded by the smallest equilib-
rium could form a coalition and be better off
joining the smallest union, which contradicts
its equilibrium properties. Finally, in equilib-
rium under Rule B, it must be that (, G) 
(, F) for a majority of countries; other-
wise, a greater set of centralized policies
would have been chosen in equilibrium.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Given individual expenditures chosen in the
first stage, preferences are single-peaked in the
second stage under weak conditions, and (8)
defines the common expenditure gmU chosen by
the median country in case of an interior solu-
tion (on which we focus). This is a decreasing
function in each gis with slope dgmU/dgms  1/
[1  (N  1)] and dgmU/dgis /[1  (N 
1)] for i  m. In the first stage, countries choose
their individual provision according to the fol-
lowing (differential) system of optimality con-
ditions:
i Hg Gis

1 
gmU
gis
1  	1  N  1

gmU
gis
, gis  0
i  1, 2, ... , N.
Substituting for dgmU/dgis we obtain that gis 
0 for any i  m and that for all countries
individually providing additional public
goods, (7) holds. Comparing (4) and (8), it
follows that gmU[1  (N  1)]  Gms 
gm[1  (N  1)] and hence gmU  gm with
strict inequality as long as some countries
provide individual expenditure, which can be
verified to require N/m  [1  (N 
2)]/(1  ).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
In the second stage, for a given federal man-
date, all countries choose their own extra pro-
visions to satisfy the system:
i Hg Gif  1, gif  0 i  1, 2, ... , N.
For a given f U, this system pins down the N˜
countries with largest i providing extra pub-
lic goods according to (10) and defines their
provisions as decreasing functions, gif 
gi
f( fU). Notice that N˜ is a step function weakly
decreasing in the federal mandate. By totally
differentiating these conditions for the indi-
vidual contributions, we obtain:
dgif
dfU  	1  N  1
   j˜N, ji
dgjf
df U .
Subtracting from both sides (dgif/dfU) and
summing over all j  N˜ , we have:
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
j˜N
dgjf
df U  N˜ 	 	1  N  1
  ¥j˜N
dgjf
df U
1   

 
N˜ 	1  N  1

	1  N˜  1
 .
Substituting the last equation into the preced-
ing one and rearranging, one easily shows that
the provision of public goods by each of these
countries is linearly decreasing in the federal
mandate, with slope [1  (N  1)]/[1 
(N˜  1)]. The slope becomes steeper every
time an increase in f U induces a new country
to stop providing extra public goods. (How-
ever, as one can easily verify, total public
good production ¥ gjf( f U)  Nf U is increas-
ing in f U.) We assume that in the first stage
the median voter theorem holds. (In general,
this may not be the case because indirect
utility in the first stage is a continuous func-
tion of f U, but it is not differentiable at the
values of the federal mandate where N˜
changes and is not necessarily single-
peaked.)21 The condition for an interior equi-
librium is
m Hg Gmf  
1
	1  N  1
   ¥j˜N
gjf
f mU
.
Substituting dgif/df U we can rewrite it as (9).
For (10) for i  m and (9) to be consistent in
equilibrium, we need the right-hand side of
the latter to be smaller or equal to 1. This sets
the constraint   (N  N˜  1)/(N  1) for
interior solutions. It follows that gif  0 for
any i  m. Moreover, it can be verified that
N˜  1 requires N/m  [1  (N 
1)](1  ). Finally, defining f mU as the federal
mandate preferred by the median country,
comparing (9) with (4) and noticing that the
right-hand side of the former is greater than
1/[1  (N  1)] if N˜  1, we conclude that
f mU[1  (N  1)]  Gmf  gm[1  (N 
1)], that is, f mU  gm, with strict inequality if
N˜  1.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
When sm  s* the right-hand side of (13) is
zero and the condition can be satisfied only if
gm(sm)  gm, which implies gm(sm)  (1/N)
¥j1
N gj(sm).
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